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JURISDICTION & NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Appellants Joy Greenwood and Ellen Hardman filed a complaint on behalf of the 
Frederick and Dorothy Westling Family Trust asserting various causes of action against 
co-trustee Mark Westling. There are four trustees of the trust: (1) Mark Westling; (2) 
Dorothy Westling; (3) Joy Greenwood; and (4) Ellen Hardman (collectively the "Co-
Trustees"). Article XIV(b) of the Trust provides: 
In the event the Co-Trustees are unable to agree on any matter 
in the administration of this Trust after the death of either 
FREDERICK GREEME WESTLING or DOROTHY E. 
WESTLING, the decision of the survivor of FREDERICK 
GREEME WESTLING or DOROTHY E. WESTLING shall 
govern so long as she or he is alive and competent. 
(R. at 131). 
Dorothy Westling, the co-trustee whose decision governs so long as she is alive 
and competent, filed a motion to intervene, which was granted by the district court. 
Subsequently, pursuant to Dorothy Westling's Motion to Dismiss, the district court, after 
having granted Dorothy Westling Motion to Intervene, determined that Ellen Hardman 
and Joy Greenwood lacked the authority to prosecute legal claims in the name of the 
Frederick and Dorothy Westling Family Trust and therefore lacked standing to file their 
complaint in the name of the trust. The district court then, without converting Dorothy 
Westling's Motion to Dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, dismissed Ellen 
Hardman's and Joy Greenwood's complaint determining that it lacked jurisdiction to 
adjudicate the claims contained therein. Ellen Hardman and Joy Greenwood now appeal 
the district court's rulings: (1) granting Dorothy Westling's Motion to Intervene; and (2) 
granting Dorothy Westling's Motion to Dismiss. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES RAISED BY APPELLANT 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Whether the trial court correctly granted Dorothy Westling's Motion to 
Intervene? 
Standard of Review: A motion to intervene involves questions of law and fact. 
Moreno v. Bd of Educ., 926 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1996). The district court's legal 
determinations are reviewed for correctness, affording no deference to its conclusions. Id. 
The district court's factual findings shall not be disturbed unless they are clearly 
erroneous. Id. Because the district court has discretion in determining whether to grant 
permissive intervention, denials of rule 24(b) motions to intervene are reviewed under an 
abuse of discretion standard. The district court abuses its discretion when it relies on an 
erroneous conclusion of law to come to its decision. Kilpatrick v. Bullough Abatement, 
Inc., 2008 UT 82,123, 199 P.3d 957. Mandatory intervention under rule 24(a), however, 
turns on legal determinations, which are reviewed de novo. In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 
2000 UT 28, \ 16, 1 P.3d 1074. 
Issue No. 2: Do Greenwood and Hardman have standing to invoke the jurisdiction 
of the district court by and through the Frederick and Dorothy Westling Family 
Trust? 
Standard of Review: The question of whether a given individual or association has 
standing to request a particular relief is primarily a question of law, although there may 
be factual findings that bear on the issue. Such factual determinations made by a trial 
court are reviewed with deference. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). 
Because of the important policy considerations involved in granting or denying standing, 
trial court determinations of whether a given set of facts fits the legal requirements for 
standing, are closely reviewed, granting minimal discretion to the trial court. Id at 938, 
939. 
Issue No. 3: Did the district court commit reversible error by failing to convert 
Dorothy Westling's Motion to Dismiss into a motion for summary judgment? 
Standard of Review: The district court's legal determinations (i.e. the determination 
of whether a motion to dismiss is based on a lack of jurisdiction) are reviewed for 
correctness, affording no deference to its conclusions. Id 
Issue No. 4: Whether Greenwood and Hardman's appeal is frivolous under rule 33 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure? 
Standard of Review: ,f[S]anctions for frivolous appeals should only be applied in 
egregious cases. . . . [yet] should be imposed when an appeal is obviously without any 
merit and has been taken with no reasonable likelihood of prevailing." Porco v. Porco, 
752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-105. Default and Mandatory Rules (related to Trusts). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellee Dorothy Westling ("Dorothy") objects to Appellants Joy Greenwood and 
Ellen Hardman's (Greenwood and Hardman") Statement of the Case because it contains 
misleading and argumentative assertions that unfairly distort the record below, states 
numerous "facts" not in the record, none of which was established below and presents 
legal issues as if they were facts. 
This case involves a dispute related to the administration of the Frederick and 
Dorothy Westling Family Trust (the "Trust"). Greenwood and Hardman filed a 
complaint naming the Trust as the Plaintiff and asserting claims against Mark Westling, a 
co-trustee of the Trust. Disagreeing with the actions of Greenwood and Hardman in 
filing the complaint, Dorothy, as co-trustee with ultimate decision making authority with 
regard to the administration of the Trust, timely intervened and subsequently filed a 
Motion to Dismiss. Dorothy's Motion to Dismiss was based solely on Greenwood and 
Hardman's lack of standing to maintain an action belonging to the Trust. Because 
Greenwood and Hardman lack standing, Dorothy asserted, which assertion was accepted 
by the district court, that the district court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the complaint 
of Greenwood and Hardman. 
Stated simply, the sole basis of Greenwood and Hardman's appeal in challenging 
the dismissal of their complaint is that they disagree with Dorothy's decision not to 
pursue legal claims belonging to the Trust, if any, against her son, Mark Westling. 
Dorothy's motivation for failing to pursue such claims, if any, is not relevant to 
Greenwood and Hardman's appeal before this Court.1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
On April 7, 2009 Greenwood and Hardman filed their complaint naming the Trust 
as Plaintiff and Mark Westling as Defendant (the "Complaint"). (R. at 1-5). The 
Complaint asserted claims for breach of contract and fraud against Mark Westling, a co-
trustee of the Trust. Id. On May 19, 2009, Mark Westling filed a motion to consolidate 
case number 090905677 with case number 093900329. (R. at 17). Greenwood and 
Hardman opposed the motion to consolidate and ultimately the district court denied Mark 
Westling's motion to consolidate. (R. at 26) Subsequently, in case number 093900329, 
Greenwood and Hardman sought to remove Dorothy and Mark Westling as co-trustees of 
Greenwood and Hardman imply that Dorothy lacks the ability to make decisions 
regarding the administration of the Trust, but such issue is not relevant to this appeal and 
has already been decided in district court case number 093900329 wherein the district 
court granted summary judgment in Dorothy's favor with respect to Greenwood and 
Hardman's claims that Dorothy was incapacitated and subject to the undue influence of 
Mark Westling. The time for appealing such decision has run. 
2
 Greenwood and Hardman's Statement of Fact violates Rule 24(a)(7), which requires a 
"statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7) 
(emphasis added). Greenwood and Hardman's appeal presents the straightforward issue 
of whether they having standing to prosecute claims on behalf of the Trust. As 
previously determined by the district court, none of the "facts" asserted by Greenwood 
and Hardman are relevant to such a determination. Further, Greenwood and Hardman's 
Statement of Fact is inconsistent with the plain language of the Trust and contains 
the Trust claiming that Dorothy was incapacitated and that Mark Westling exerted undue 
influence over Dorothy. (R. at 18). The district court in case number 093900329 granted 
summary judgment in Dorothy's favor and declined to remove Dorothy and Mark 
Westling as co-trustees. 
On July 8, 2009, Dorothy filed her motion to intervene. (R. at 63). On July 18, 
2009, the district court, finding that Dorothy had satisfied the four part test set-forth in 
Chatterton v. Walker, 938 P.2d 255 (1997), granted Dorothy's Motion to Intervene in 
full, thereby, presumably, incorporating Dorothy's arguments into the order by reference. 
On July 27, 2009, Dorothy filed her Motion to Dismiss requesting that the district court 
dismiss the Complaint because Greenwood and Hardman lacked standing and therefore, 
jurisdiction to adjudicate the Complaint. (R. at 109). On September 11, 2009, the district 
court issued its minute entry granting Dorothy's Motion to Dismiss (the "Order of 
Dismissal"), which provided, in part:: 
After considering the parties' respective legal positions, the 
Court determines that Article XVI(b) of the Trust documents 
is dispositive. Ms. Westling's [Dorothy's] decision 
concerning the administration of the Trust governs so long as 
she is alive and competent...Further, Article XVI(b) prevails 
over any provision of Utah trust law that may be to the 
contrary. 
Finally, the reasonableness of Ms. Westling's decision to not 
pursue litigation is irrelevant to the pivotal issue of whether 
the Co-Trustees have standing to bring this action in the 
absence of Ms. Westling's consent...Since this Court lacks 
jurisdiction over the claims advanced by the Trust, MS. 
Westling's Motion to Dismiss is granted. 
numerous statements of law. 
(R. at 192-193). 
Subsequent to the entry of the Order of Dismissal, Greenwood and Hardman filed 
their Rule 59 Motion to Set Aside or Vacate the Court's Ruling Granting Ms. Westling's 
Motion to Dismiss (the "Rule 59 Motion") arguing that Dorothy's Motion to Dismiss was 
required to be converted into a motion for summary judgment. (R. at 195). The district 
court denied the Rule 59 Motion stating, in pertinent part: 
In this case, Ms. Westling's [Dorothy's] Motion to Dismiss 
for lack of standing to initiate this action under Article 
XIV(b) of the relevant Trust documents. The Court's 
decision, in considering the issue of standing and hence the 
Court's jurisdiction over this matter, did not hinge on Ms. 
Westling's affidavit, but was instead focused on the Trust 
language to determine whether she had ultimate decision 
making authority with respect to Trust matters...Further, the 
plaintiffs [Greenwood and Hardman's] remaining assertion, 
that there exist issues of fact as to the validity of Ms. 
Westling's decisions, amount to a re-argument of its prior 
position, which this Court previously rejected as irrelevant. 
(R. at 218.) 
The Trust was created pursuant to that certain Trust Agreement, dated August 6, 
1993, by and between Frederick Greeme Westling and Dorothy E. Westling, as grantors, 
and Frederick G. Westling, Dorothy E. Westling, Joy Ann W. Greenwood, Ellen W. 
Hardman and Mark Westling, as co-trustees. (R. at 119-134). Frederick G. Westling is 
deceased. Article V. provides, "After the death of the deceased spouse [Frederick], the 
Co-trustees shall manage and distribute the assets of the Trust for the benefit of the 
surviving spouse [Dorothy]..." (R. at 122). The Trust does not provide for current 
distributions of principal or income to a party other than the surviving spouse [Dorothy]. 
Article XIV(b) of the Trust provides: 
In the event the Co-Trustees are unable to agree on any matter 
in the administration of this Trust after the death of either 
FREDERICK GREEME WESTLING or DOROTHY E. 
WESTLING, the decision of the survivor of FREDERICK 
GREEME WESTLING or DOROTHY E. WESTLING shall 
govern so long as she or he is alive and competent. 
(R. at 131.) 
Dorothy: (1) did not join in the filing of Greenwood and Hardman's complaint 
naming the Trust as the plaintiff; (2) did not consent to the initiation of this litigation; and 
(3) is alive and has not been adjudicated to be incapacitated. (R. at 1-5; 136-137). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
L As evidenced by this appeal, district court case number 093900329 (case in 
which Greenwood and Hardman attempted to have Dorothy removed as a co-trustee of 
her own trust) and the filing of the Complaint, Dorothy's interests and desires with 
respect to the administration of the Trust are in direct conflict with Greenwood and 
Hardman, therefore Greenwood and Hardman cannot adequately represent Dorothy's 
interests. 
2. If the Co-Trustees are unable to agree on any matter in the administration of 
the Trust, Dorothy's decision governs, therefore, because Dorothy did not join in the 
filing of the Complaint and opposed such filing, Greenwood and Hardman lack standing 
to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court. 
3. Because Dorothy's Motion to Dismiss disputed the district court's 
jurisdiction to adjudicate the Complaint, it was clearly not filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and, therefore, is not converted into a motion for 
summary judgment merely because an affidavit, which had no bearing on the district 
court's decision, was filed in conjunction with her Motion to Dismiss. 
4. Greenwood and Hardman's appeal is not based on established facts, not 
supported by existing law and not based on a good faith argument, or any argument for 
that matter, that existing law should be overturned or modified, their appeal is frivolous 
justifying an award of damages pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
L NEITHER GREENWOOD AND HARDMAN NOR MARK WESTLING 
ARE CAPABLE OF ADEQUATELY REPRESENTING DOROTHY'S 
INTERESTS, THEREFORE THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN 
GRANTING DOROTHY'S MOTION TO INTERVENE. 
As evidenced by Greenwood and Hardman's: (1) failed attempt to remove 
Dorothy as co-trustee of her own trust in district court case number 093900329; (2) filing 
of the Complaint in contravention of Dorothy's approval; and (3) this appeal itself, 
Greenwood and Hardman's interests are in direct conflict with Dorothy's interests. 
Further, Mark Westling did not and does not possesses sufficient authority under the 
Trust to efficiently and expeditiously cause the dismissal of the Complaint. Therefore, 
Dorothy's interests were incapable of being adequately represented by Greenwood and 
Hardman or Mark Westling. 
Rule 24(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that, "upon a timely 
motion, a party shall be permitted to intervene ...or (2) when the applicant claims an 
AQA1 S.AQ1 < i m 1 ~ 
interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is 
so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede 
his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented 
by existing parties." Utah R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
Utah courts apply Rule 24(a) as a four-part test, and find a right to intervene 
where: (1) the application is timely, (2) the applicant claims an interest relating to the 
property or transaction which is the subject of the action, (3) the applicant's interest may 
as a practical matter be impaired or impeded by the action, and (4) the applicant's interest 
is not adequately represented by existing parties. Utah Ass 'n of Counties v. Clinton, 255 
F.3d 1246, 1249 (10th Cir. 2001); Chatterton v. Walker, 938 P.2d 255, 258-59 (Utah 
1997). Courts are liberal in allowing intervention. See, e.g., Utah Ass Jn of Counties, 255 
F.3d at 1249; Chatterton, 938 P.2d at 258. 
As to the fourth prong, "adequacy of representation," adequacy of representation 
generally turns on whether there is an identity or divergence of interest between the 
potential intervenor and an original party and on whether that interest is diligently 
represented. Lima v. Chambers, 657 P.2d 279, 283 (Utah 1982) (citing Alsbach v. Bader, 
Mo.App., 616 S.W.2d 147, 151 (1981)); Annot, 84 A.L.R.2d 1412 (1962). Generally, 
where the applicant's interest is different from that of an existing party, the applicant's 
interest is not represented. Id. Again, this burden is "minimal" requiring the would-be-
intervenor only to show that "representation may be inadequate." Utah Ass'n of 
Counties, 255 F.3d at 1254 (emphasis added); United States v. Michigan, 424 F.3d 438, 
443 (6th Cir. 2005). 
Greenwood and Hardman challenge the district court's order granting Dorothy's 
Motion to Intervene by claiming that they adequately represent Dorothy's interests. (Br. 
of Appellant at 23). Greenwood and Hardman's interests are in opposite of Dorothy's 
interests. First, Greenwood and Hardman attempted to remove Dorothy as co-trustee of 
her own trust in case number 093900329. Second, Dorothy did not consent to the filing 
of the Complaint. Although, the justification for disagreeing with the filing of the 
Complaint is not relevant, Dorothy does not believe pursuing litigation against Mark 
Westling is economically prudent because Mark Westling acknowledges the debt to the 
Trust and has agreed to repay it when he is financially able. Therefore, Greenwood and 
Hardman's complaint does not accomplish anything that has not already been agreed to 
through Dorothy's amicable negotiation with Mark Westling. 
As evidenced by this appeal, district court case number 093900329 and the filing 
of the Complaint without Dorothy's consent, Greenwood and Hardman's interest are in 
direct conflict with Dorothy's. Therefore, pursuant to Alsbach v. Bader , Greenwood and 
Hardman cannot possibly represent Dorothy's interests because those interests are in 
direct conflict with those of Dorothy. 
As to the issue of whether Mark Westling can adequately represent Dorothy's 
interests, which issue has not been raised by Greenwood and Hardman, Dorothy, under 
the plain and unambiguous terms of the Trust, possesses ultimate decision making 
authority with respect to the administration of the Trust. In that regard she is the only 
party capable of efficiently and expediently ending this litigation. This is because 
deciding whether to pursue legal claims on behalf of the Trust is squarely within the 
powers of administration granted to her under the Trust and the Utah Trust Code. 
Therefore, Dorothy, as final decision maker, controls all legal claims possessed by the 
Trust. Mark Westling cannot adequately represent Dorothy's interests because he does 
not possesses the power nor the authority to control litigation initiated on behalf of the 
Trust. 
Greenwood and Hardman next argue that Dorothy's interests, as expressed by 
Dorothy, are incorrect and therefore, they can adequately represent what they claim her 
interests should be. (Br. of Appellant at 23). Such argument lacks merit as Dorothy is 
within her right to have an interest that differs from Greenwood and Hardman's. Simply 
stated, she and only she can determine what her interests are and the merits of Dorothy's 
interests are not controvertible. 
Next, although unclear from Greenwood and Hardman's brief, Greenwood and 
Hardman seem to argue that Dorothy failed to file an affidavit in support of her Motion to 
Intervene and therefore the Motion to Intervene should have been denied. (Br. of 
Appellant at 23, 24). Noticeably absent from Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the jurisprudence interpreting Rule 24 is any requirement that an affidavit 
be filed in support of a motion to intervene. Therefore, Greenwood and Hardman's 
argument fails because it imposes an additional requirement that does not exist under 
Utah law. 
IL CONSISTENT WITH THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL, 
GREENWOOD AND HARDMAN LACK STANDING TO FILE A 
COMPLAINT ASSERTING CLAIMS BELONGING TO THE TRUST. 
Because Dorothy possesses ultimate decision making authority with respect to all 
matters relating to the administration of the Trust and she did not join in the filing of the 
Complaint, Greenwood and Hardman lack standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court 
on behalf of the Trust, "[SJtanding is a jurisdictional requirement that must be satisfied 
before a court may entertain a controversy between two parties." Jones v. Barlow, 2007 
UT 20? \ 12, 154 P3d 808 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Harris v. Springville City, 712 P.2d 188, 190 (Utah 1986) ("[L]ack of standing is 
jurisdictional.'1); Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983) (holding that a party 
must have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court). 
Article XIV(b) of the Trust provides: 
In the event the Co-Trustees are unable to agree on any matter 
in the administration of this Trust after the death of either 
FREDERICK GREEME WESTLING or DOROTHY R 
WESTLING, the decision of the survivor of FREDERICK 
GREEME WESTLING or DOROTHY E. WESTLING shall 
2Qvern so Ions as she or he is alive and competent, 
(R. at 131) (emphasis added). 
The Utah Uniform Trust Code, as well as the Trust, grants trustees, among other 
powers, the power to, "pay or contest any claim, settle a claim by or against the trust, and 
release, in whole or in part, a claim belonging to the trust/' Utah Code Ann. §75-7-
814(n). The commentary to the Uniform Trust Code clarifies that: 
It may not be reasonable to enforce a claim depending upon 
the likelihood of recovery and the cost of suit and 
enforcement. It might also be reasonable to settle an action or 
suffer a default rather than to defend an action. See also 
Section 816(14) (power to pay, contest, settle, or release 
claims). 
Commentary to §811 of the Uniform Trust Code. 
Further, a trustee may release a claim or choose not to pursue a claim not only 
when it is uncollectible, but also when collection would be uneconomic. See Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts Section 192 (1959) (power to compromise, arbitrate and abandon 
claims). Section 75-7-805 of the Utah Code Ann. provides, "[i]n administering a trust, 
the trustee may incur only costs that are reasonable in relation to the trust property..." 
Utah Code. Ann. §75-7-805. 
Section 75-7-105(2) of the Utah Code Ann. provides, "Except as specifically 
provided in this chapter, the terms of a trust prevail over any provision of this chapter..." 
Utah Code Ann. §75-7-105(2). No provision of the Utah Trust Code specifically 
overrides Article XIV(b) of the Trust. See Utah Code Ann. §75-7-101 etseq. 
Consistent with the district court's Order of Dismissal, Article XIV(b) of the Trust 
is dispositive. Pursuant to the above quoted provision of the Utah Code, the decision as 
to whether to pursue claims belonging to the Trust fails squarely within a trustee's 
powers to administer a trust. Although the process Dorothy went through in determining 
not to pursue a claim against her son is not relevant, Dorothy has analyzed the costs of 
maintaining an action against Mark Westling, the likelihood of succeeding on such claim 
and the likelihood of being able to collect on any potential judgment. (R. at 5). Dorothy 
has decided that the costs greatly outweigh any benefits to the Trust in maintaining this 
litigation and therefore did not and does not agree with maintaining this litigation. Id. 
Because pursuant to Article XIV(b) of the Trust, which provision Greenwood and 
Hardman fail to discuss, Dorothy's decision regarding the administration of the Trust 
governs. Dorothy controls all Trust litigation and has decided not to pursue claims 
against her son, Mark Westling, therefore Greenwood and Hardman lack authority and 
therefore standing to file a complaint asserting legal claims belonging to the Trust. 
Because Greenwood and Hardman lack standing, the Complaint failed to invoke the 
jurisdiction of the district court and as such the district court properly dismissed the 
Complaint. 
IIL THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR BY 
NOT CONVERTING DOROTHY'S MOTION TO DISMISS INTO A 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE HER MOTION TO 
DISMISS WAS CLEARLY BASED SOLELY ON THE DISTRICT 
COURT'S LACK OF JURISDICTION. 
Because Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does not convert motions 
based on subsections (b)(1) through (5) into motions for summary judgment merely 
because they include some affirmative evidence relating to the basis for the motion, the 
district court did not error in failing to convert Dorothy's Motion to Dismiss. "Rule 12, 
however, does not convert motions based on subsections (b)(1) through (5) (which are 
raised as part of the initial responsive pleadings) into motions for summary judgment 
simply because they include some affirmative evidence relating to the basis for the 
motion/' Spoons v. Lewis, 987 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1999); Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 
UT 16, 1J20, 40 P3d, 632, 638 ("This argument mistakenly assumes that a motion to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(1) is converted to a motion for summary judgment if affidavits are attached.'5 
Apart from the fact that it is apparent from Dorothy's filing of her Motion to 
Dismiss that she did not consent to the filing of the Complaint, the district court explicitly 
held that it's decision "did not hinge on Ms. Westling's affidavit.3" (R. at 218 ). Further, 
it is apparent from Dorothy's memorandum in support of her motion to dismiss, reply 
memorandum and opposition to the Rule 59 Motion, that Dorothy's Motion to dismiss 
was filed and based solely on jurisdictional grounds. 
Dorothy's memorandum in support of her Motion to Dismiss provides: 
Because they [Greenwood and Hardman] lack the requisite 
authority, this Court does not have jurisdiction over this 
action because Joy Greenwood and Ellen Hardman lacked 
standing to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court in the name 
of the Trust 
(R. at 116). 
Dorothy's reply memorandum in support of her motion to dismiss provides: 
The sole issue before the Court is whether Joy Greenwood 
and Ellen Hardman have the authority and therefore the 
standing to maintain this action. Pursuant to Article XVI(b) 
of the Trust and Utah Code Ann. §§75-7-105 (1) & (2) and 
The district court stated, "The Court's decision, in considering the issue of standing and 
hence the Court's jurisdiction over this matter, did not hinge on Ms. Westling's affidavit, 
but was instead focused on the Trust language to determine whether she had ultimate 
decision making authority with respect to Trust matters..." (R. at 218 ). Greenwood and 
Hardman dispute this plain statement of the district court by stating, "Clearly, in granting 
Ms. Westling's [Dorothy's] Motion to Dismiss, the trial court relied on Ms. Westling's 
affidavit." (Br. of Appellant at 20). The integrity of the district court is incontrovertible 
under circumstances such as these. Hardman and Greenwood cannot possibly dispute, 
with competent evidence, what the district court relied on and therefore their argument 
disputing the veracity of the trial court does not merit a response. 
the answer is clearly no. Therefore this Court lacks 
jurisdictions to adjudicate the claims advanced by Plaintiffs. 
Simply stated, when this Court lacks jurisdiction, it retains 
only the jurisdiction to dismiss. 
(R. at 175). 
Dorothy's opposition to Greenwood and Hardman's Rule 59 Motion provides: 
It is clear that Dorothy's Motion to Dismiss was based upon a 
lack of standing and hence jurisdiction and not upon a failure 
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Rules 
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(2) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(R. at 206). 
Greenwood and Hardman mistakenly claim that Dorothy's Motion to Dismiss 
must have been based on Rule 12(b)(6), when Dorothy's briefing clearly and 
unequivocally indicates that it was based on jurisdictional grounds, including, without 
limitation, rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Because Dorothy's Motion to Dismiss was based on a lack of jurisdiction, the 
filing of an affidavit in support of her motion did not require the district court to convert 
it into a motion for summary judgment even if the district court relied on Dorothy's 
affidavit, which, contrary to Greenwood and Hardman's assertions, it stated it did not. 
IV. PURSUANT TO RULE 33 THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD DOROTHY 
JUST DAMAGES, INCLUDING DOUBLE COSTS AND REASONABLE 
ATTORNEY FEES BECAUSE EACH CLAIM CONTAINED IN THE 
GREENWOOD AND HARDMAN'S APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS. 
As demonstrated above and as is facially clear from Greenwood and Hardman's 
appellate brief, their appeal contains arguments that are directly contrary to established 
Utah jurisprudence and directly contrary to Utah statutory law. Further, Hardman and 
Greenwood failed to marshal the evidence, failed to discuss Article XIV(b) of the Trust, 
which the district court determined was dispositive, failed to cite any legal authority for 
their arguments and their arguments are, to a large extent, supported by purported facts 
not in the record. 
Rule 33 provides, in pertinent part: 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first 
appeal of right in a criminal case, if the court determines that 
a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either 
frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may 
include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or 
reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court 
may order that the damages be paid by the party or by the 
party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous 
appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not 
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not 
based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or 
reverse existing law. 
Utah RApp. P. 33(a) &(b). 
The case law applying Rule 33 holds that an appeal lacking in merit violates Rule 
33. For example, O'Brien v. Rusk 744 P.2d 306, 310 (Utah Ct.App.1987) stated, "a 
frivolous appeal is one without merit." Further, Chapman v. Uintah City, 81 P.3d 761 
(2003) held, "A claim should be deemed to be without merit when it "is 'frivolous' or 'of 
little weight or importance having no basis in law or fact." Dorothy acknowledges that 
the Utah Court of Appeals has added a judicial gloss to Rule 33. Specifically, in Porco v. 
Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 368-69 (Utah Ct.App.1988) this Court held, "[Sanctions for 
frivolous appeals should only be applied in egregious cases. . . . [yet] should be imposed 
when an appeal is obviously without any merit and has been taken with no reasonable 
likelihood of prevailing." Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Cooke v. Cooke, 2001 UT App 110, ^ 14, 22 P.3d 
1249 ("[t]he sanction for filing a frivolous appeal applies only in 'egregious cases1 with 
no 'reasonable legal or factual basis. ) (quoting Maughn v. Maughn, 770 P.2d 156, 162 
(Utah Ct App. 1989)). 
This case is especially egregious. In essence, Greenwood and Hardman: (1) 
ignore the basis for Dorothy's arguments below in claiming that her Motion to Dismiss 
was not based on jurisdiction, but rather a failure to state a claim; (2) completely ignore 
two rulings of the district court, each of which held that Article XIV(b) is dispositive in 
that Dorothy has final decision making authority with respect to all matters relating to the 
administration of the Trust; (3) misstate and/or ignore the plain language of the Trust; (4) 
make arguments, the majority, if not all, of which are not relevant to determining whether 
Greenwood and Hardman have standing; (5) support such arguments with "facts" not in 
the record; (6) fail to cite to any authority supporting their legal positions; and (7) fail to 
even attempt to establish that existing law should be extended, overruled or modified. 
As applied to this case and as demonstrated above, Greenwood and Hardman have 
repeatedly asserted arguments directly in opposite to Utah statutes and case law and have 
elected to ignore the plain language of the Trust, the provisions of which are dispositive 
to this matter. Moreover, each argument advanced by Greenwood and Hardman contains 
facts not in the record and each argument fails to cite to facts in the record that are 
contrary to the positions Greenwood and Hardman's take in this appeal. Perhaps most 
egregious, Greenwood and Hardman's arguments are contrary to established Utah 
jurisprudence and statutory law. Indeed, Hardman and Greenwoods do not even attempt 
to argue that such established law should be overturned or cite to any distinguishing 
authority. Therefore, pursuant to the plain and unambiguous language of Rule 33 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and the addition of the "egregious" requirement, this 
Court should award Dorothy reasonable attorney fees and double costs. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should uphold the district court's Order of 
Dismissal and order granting Dorothy's Motion to Intervene because it is clear that 
Greenwood and Hardman lack standing to adjudicate claims belonging to the Trust. 
Greenwood and Hardman's interests in this matter are in polar opposite to those of 
Dorothy. Further, this Court should award Dorothy reasonable attorney fees and double 
costs as Dorothy is an 88 year old woman on a fixed income that has been forced to incur 
substantial costs in defending against Greenwood and Hardman's, Dorothy's own 
children's, frivolous litigation. 
DATED this 2 _ day of April, 2010. 
KENT B. ALDERMAN 
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Addendum 1: Determinative Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-105- Default and Mandatory Rules 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in the terms of the trust, this chapter governs the duties 
and powers of a trustee, relations among trustees, and the rights and interests of a 
beneficiary. 
(2) Except as specifically provided in this chapter, the terms of a trust prevail over any 
provision of this chapter except: 
(a) the requirements for creating a trust; 
(b) the duty of a trustee to act in good faith and in accordance with the purposes of the 
trust; 
(c) the requirement that a trust and its terms be for the benefit of its beneficiaries; 
(d) the power of the court to modify or terminate a trust under Sections 75-7-410 through 
75-7-416; 
(e) the effect of a spendthrift provision, Section 26-6-14, and the rights of certain 
creditors and assignees to reach a trust as provided in Part 5, Creditor's Claims-
Spendthrift and Discretionary Trusts; 
(f) the power of the court under Section 75-7-702 to require, dispense with, or modify or 
terminate a bond; 
(g) the effect of an exculpatory term under Section 75-7-1008; 
(h) the rights under Sections 75-7-1010 through 75-7-1013 of a person other than a 
trustee or beneficiary; 
(i) periods of limitation for commencing a judicial proceeding; and 
(j) the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court and venue for commencing a proceeding as 
provided in Sections 75-7-203 and 75-7-205. 
ADDENDUM 2 
Frederick and Dorothy Westling Family Trust 
THE FREDERICK AND 
DOROTHY WESTLING 
FAMILY TRUST 
THIS TRUST AGREEMENT made and entered into at Salt Lake City, Utah this 
&? day of August, 1993, by and between FREDERICK G R E E M E WESTLING and 
D O R O T H Y E. WESTLING of Sandy, Utah, hereinafter called the "Grantors, and 
FREDERICK G. WESTLING, DOROTHY E. WESTLING, JOY ANN W, 
GREENWOOD, ELLEN W. HARDMAN, and MARK WESTLING, Co-trustees, 
hereinafter referred to collectively as the "Co-trustees". 
W I T N E S S E T H 
WHEREAS, the Grantors desire by this Trust Agreement to establish a revocable 
trust upon the conditions and for the purposes and uses hereinafter set forth to make 
provision for the care and management of a certain Part of the Grantors ' present property 
and for the ultimate distribution of the trust property and funds created hereby. 
NOW T H E R E F O R E , in consideration of tfie promises, agreements and undertakings 
of the parties hereto, the Grantors hereby assign, transfer, convey and deliver unto the Co-
trustees* the assets listed on Exhibit "A", to have and to hold the same in trust, to manage, 
invest and reinvest the same and any additions that may from time to time be made thereto, 




During the joint lifetimes of the Grantors, the Co-trustees shall pay to, or shall apply 
for, the Grantors' benefit, the net income of the Trust estate in quarter-annual or more 
frequent installments. If the Co-Trustees consider the net income insufficient, they shall pay 
to, o r apply for the benefit of the Grantors as much of the principal as is necessary in the 
Co-Trustees' discretion for the Grantors' proper health, education, support, maintenance, 
comfort and welfare, in accordance with their accustomed manner of living at the date of 
this instrument. The Co-Trustees shall exercise in a liberal manner the power to invade 
principal contained in this paragraph, and the rights of the Grantors ' children shall be con-
sidered of secondary importance. 
ARTICLE II 
POWER O F INVASION 
The Grantors acting jointly may at any time direct the Co-Trustees in writing to pay 
single sums or periodic payments out of the Trust estate to any person or organization. 
ARTICLE III 
DEFINITION 
The first Grantor to die shall be called the "Deceased Spouse" and the surviving 
Grantor shall be called the "Surviving Spoused 
ARTICLE IV 
PAYMENTS ON D E A T H OF FIRST SPOUSE 
O n the death of the Deceased Spouse, the Co-Trustees shall pay out of the Trust 
estate all of the valid debts of the Deceased Spouse, the estate and inheritance taxes, 
including interest and penalties attributable to the trust estate, the last illness and funeral 
expenses of the Deceased Spouse, attorney's fees, and other costs incurred in administering 
the Deceased Spouse's estate. 
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ARTICLE V 
TRUST FOR SURVIVING SPOUSE 
After the death of the deceased spouse, the Co-trustees shall manage and distribute 
the assets of the Trust for the benefit of the surviving spouse as follows: 
(a) The Co-trustees shall pay to the Surviving Spouse, during his or her lifetime, all 
the income of the Trust, in monthly or other convenient installments, but in no event less 
frequently than annually 
(b) In the event of emergency befalling the Surviving Spouse, such as illness, accident 
or other distress, Co-trustees are authorized to use and expend such part of the principal 
of the Trust as Co-trustees may deem necessary or desirable for medical, dental, hospital, 
nursing expenses and expenses of invalidism. 
(c) The Co-trustees shall permit the Surviving Spouse to use and enjoy all of the 
Deceased Spouse's interest in the family home during the Surviving Spouse's lifetime or so 
long as the Surviving Spouse desires and the Surviving Spouse shall not be required to pay 
any rent for the privilege of using the same. 
(d) Co-trustees are authorized with the written consent of a majority of the Grantors' 
then living children, to pay to the Surviving Spouse such portions of the principal of the 
Trust as the Co-trustees shall from time to time determine to be necessary in their absolute 
and uncontrolled discretion for his or her maintenance in health, support and reasonable 
comfort. 
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ARTICLE VI 
PAYMENTS ON THE DEATH O F SURVIVING SPOUSE 
O n the death of the Surviving Spouse, the remaining Trustee shall pay out of the 
Trust estate all of the valid debts of the Surviving Spouse, the estate and inheritance taxes, 
if any, any and all doctor or hospital bills, funeral expenses, attorney's fees and any and all 
costs incurred in administering the Surviving Spouse's estate. 
ARTICLE VII 
JONATHAN KIP WESTLINO TRUST 
After the death of the Grantors, the Co-Trustees shall hold all of the Trust assets in 
the JONATHAN KIP WESTLING T R U S T The Co-Trustees shall hold, manage, invest 
and reinvest the trust assets subject to the hereinafter provided Trust and terms, conditions, 
powers and agreements relating thereto. 
SECTION L DISPOSITION OF PRINCIPAL AND INCOME 
(a) The Co-Trustees shall pay or apply for the benefit of JONATHAN KIP 
WESTLING during his lifetime such amounts from the principal or income, or both, of the 
Trust for the satisfaction of JONATHAN KIP WESTLING's special needs, as the Co-
Trustees in their sole discretion may from time to time deem reasonable or necessary subject 
to the limitations set out in this Trust Agreement. Any income of the Trust not distributed 
shall be added annually to the principal 
(b) As used in this Trust Agreement, "special needs" refers to the requisites of 
maintaining JONATHAN KIP WESTLING's health, safety and welfare when, in the 
discretion of the Co-Trustees such needs are not being provided by any public or private 
agency, including any state, the United States, or any insurance carrier with insurance 
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policies covering JONATHAN KIP WESTLING, "Special needs" shall be limited to special 
equipment, transportation, training programs, education, travel expenses, recreation, 
supplemental nursing care, dental care, unreimbursable medical expenses and items of 
comfort (but not of support) for JONATHAN KIP WESTLING subject to the limitations 
set forth in subparagraph (c) following. 
(c) The Co-Trustees are prohibited from expending any of the Trust principal or 
income for any property, services, benefits or medical care otherwise available to 
JONATHAN KIP WESTLING from any governmental source or from any insurance carrier 
required to cover JONATHAN KIP WESTLING. The Co-Trustees may pay any deductible 
amounts for JONATHAN KIP WESTLING on any insurance policies covering JONATHAN 
KIP WESTLING. The Co-Trustees shall cooperate with JONATHAN KIP WESTLING and 
his family to seek support and maintenance for JONATHAN KIP WESTLING from all 
available resources, including but not limited to, the Supplemental Social Security Income 
Program (SSI); the Old Age Survivor and Disability Insurance Program (OASDI); the 
Medicaid Program, and any additional, similar or successor programs; and from any private 
support sources. The Co-Trustees may supplement, but may not supplant, services, benefits 
and medical care avaflable to JONATHAN KIP WESTLING which is available through any 
governmental or private resource. 
SECTION TL TRUST ADMINISTRATION AND PROTECTIVE PROVISIONS 
(a) This is a Discretionary Non-Support Spendthrift Trust None of the principal or 
income of the Trust Estate or any interest therein, shall be anticipated, assigned, or 
encumbered, or be subject to any creditors* claims or to any legal process. Furthermore, 
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because this Trust is to be conserved and maintained for the special needs of JONATHAN 
KIP WESTLING who may be physically or mentally disabled or impaired during his lifetime, 
no par t of the Trust Estate shall be construed as part of JONATHAN KIP WESTLING's 
estate, or be subject to the claims of voluntary or involuntary creditors of JONATHAN KIP 
WESTLING including any agency of the State of Utah, or any other state, or the United 
States. No part of the Trust Estate shall be liable to JONATHAN KIP WESTLlNG's 
creditors during his lifetime or after his death. 
(b) No part of the Trust assets shall be used to supplant or replace public assistance 
benefits of any county, state, or federal agency, to which JONATHAN KIP WESTLING is 
entitled by law. No part of the Trust shall be used to supplant or replace benefits due from 
any insurance carrier under any insurance policy covering JONATHAN KIP WESTLING. 
(c) All reasonable expenses in establishing, maintaining, administering, and defending 
this Trust, including but not limited to reasonable attorneys* fees, accounting fees, Co-
Trusteed fees, and costs shall be a proper charge to the Trust. 
(d) The validity of this Trust shall be determined by the laws of the State of Utah. 
(e) The Co-Trustees shall not be liable to JONATHAN KIP WESTLING or any 
other party for acts undertaken by the Co-Trustees in good faith. 
(f) Under no circumstances can JONATHAN KIP WESTLING compel a distribution 
from the Trust for any purpose. The Co-TrusteesT discretion in making non-support 
disbursements is final as to all interested parties, even if the Co-Trustees elect to make no 
disbursements at all. Further, the Co-Trustees may be arbitrary and unreasonable. Hie Co-
Trustees' sole and independent judgment, rather than any other party's determination, is 
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intended to be the criterion on which disbursements are made. No court or any other 
person should substitute its or their judgment for the decision or decisions made by the Co-
Trustees. 
SECTION III. TERMINATION OF TRUST 
In the event that the existence of this Trust has the effect of rendering either 
JONATHAN KIP WESTLING ineligible for any public benefit or any entitlement program, 
the Co-Trustees are authorized, but not required, to terminate this Trust In the event of 
termination, the undistributed balance, principal and accrued and undistributed income, shall 
be distributed outright and free of Trust in equal shares to JOAN HELEN W. GROOM, 
JEAN W. SEAGER, MARK WESTLING, JOY ANN W. GREENWOOD, ELLEN W. 
HARDMAN, and DAVID PETER WESTLING, and by right of representation to their 
issue in the event they are deceased. 
SECTION IV. PAYMENTS AND DISTRIBUTIONS ON DEATH OF JONATHAN KIP 
WESTLING. 
Upon the death of JONATHAN KIP WESTLING, all remaining Trust assets shall 
be distributed by the Co-Trustees as provided in Article VIII. 
ARTICLE VIII 
WESTLING CHILDREN TRUSTS 
After the death of both of the Grantors and JONATHAN KIP WESTLING, the Co-
Trustees shall divide the Trust assets into six (6) equal shares: ONE (1) share for each of 
the foUowing children of the Grantors: JOAN HELEN WESTUNG GROOM, JEAN 
WESTLING SEAGER, MARK WESTLING, JOY ANN WESTLING GREENWOOD, 
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ELLEN WESTUNG HARDMAN, and DAVID PETER WESTLTNG. Thereafter, the Co-
Trustees shall distribute each share as follows: 
(1) If the Grantors* child is then alive, his or her share estate shall be distributed to 
him or her outright and free of trust 
(2) If any child is then deceased with issue surviving, the Co-Trustees shall hold the 
deceased child's share in trust until the youngest of such issue living at the death of the child 
attains the age of twenty-one (21) years or would have attained the age of twenty-one (21) 
years had he or she lived so long, at which time the Co-Trustees shall pay over the principal 
of the Trust in equal shares to the then living issue of the deceased child, per stirpes, and 
by right of representation. 
(a) Prior to the time that such deceased child's issue attains the age of twenty-
one (21) years, the Co-Trustees, in their sole discretion, may use so much or all of 
the Trust income and principal of the Trust as the Co-Trustees deem for the best 
interest of the deceased child's respective issue, for his or her health, maintenance, 
comfort, support, and education (including college, university, business, professional, 
or equivalent training), wedding expenses, and expenses while serving on a mission 
for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. 
(3) If any child of the Grantors dies before receiving all of the principal of his or her 
respective trust without leaving issue surviving him or her, or in the event all of his or her 
issue shall die before final distribution of all of the assets of his or her separate trust, the 
principal of his or her trust shall be added to the trusts of the other children of the Grantors 
(counting as one such trust the trust held for the issue of another deceased child of the 
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Grantors), in equal proportions, to be held in trust if such trusts have not been distributed 
or to be distributed outright to the Grantors' other chfldren if their trusts have been already 
distributed to them, or if the Grantors* other children have already received final distribution 




No interest of any beneficiary in the Trusts created herein, nor any part of such 
interests, shall in any event be subject to sale, assignment, hypothecation or transfer by any 
beneficiary or subject to any judgment rendered against any beneficiary or subject to the 
process of any court in aid of execution of any judgment so rendered, and all of the income 
and/or principal under this Trust shall be transferable, payable and deliverable only to the 
beneficiaries designated hereunder at the time they are entitled to take the same under the 
terms of this Trust 
ARTICLE X 
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITY 
Anything to the contrary notwithstanding the trusts created herein shall terminate not 
later than twenty-one (21) years after the death of the last survivor of the Grantors, their 
chfldren and their grandchildren who are living at the death of the deceased spouse, and if 
any trust created herein has not sooner terminated, Co-trustees at said time shall pay over, 
convey, and deliver the remaining Trust assets then in their possession in equal shares to the 
persons then entided to receive the income therefrom. 
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ARTICLE X[ 
POWER OF GRANTORS 
(a) During the joint lifetimes of the Grantors, this Trust may be revoked in whole 
or in part by an instrument in writing signed by both Grantors and delivered by certified mail 
to the Co-Trustees- On revocation, the Co-Trustees shall promptly deliver to the Grantors 
all, or the designated portion, of the Trust assets. The Co-Trustees shall also account for 
their acts since the preceding account, ff this instrument is revoked with respect to all major 
portions of the assets subject to the instrument, the Co-Trustees shall be entitled to retain 
sufficient assets reasonable to secure payment of liabilities lawfully incurred by the Co-
Trustees in the administration of the Trust, unless the Grantors shall indemnify the Co-
Trustees against loss or expense, 
(b) The Grantors may at any time during their joint lifetimes amend any of the terms 
of this instrument by an instrument in writing signed by both Grantors and delivered 
personally or by certified mail to the Co-Trustees. No amendment shall substantially 
increase the duties or liabilities of the Co-Trustees without the Go-Trustees' consent, nor 
shall the Co-Trustees be obligated to act under such an amendment unless the Co-Trustees 
accept i t If a Trustee is removed^ the Grantors shall pay to the Trustee any sums due and 
shall indemnify the Trustee against liability lawfully incurred by the Trustee in the 
administration of the Trusts. 
(e) On the death of the Deceased Spouse, this Trust shall become irrevocable and 





Income accrued on property originally placed in or subsequently added to the Trust, 
at the time of its transfer to the Co-Trustees, and dividends on shares of stock originally 
placed in or subsequently added to the Trust which are declared prior to the date such 
shares are placed in or added to the Trust, but payable to stockholders of record determined 
as of the date which is on or subsequent to the date such shares are placed in or added to 
the Trust, shall be income of the Trust Upon the termination of any estate, interest, or 
Trust hereunder, all income which has accrued on Trust assets, but which has not been 
received by said Co-Trustees and all dividends declared, but not yet received by said Co-
trustees, shall belong to the succeeding estate subject to any charges or advances against said 
income or dividends. 
ARTICLE XIII 
PAYMENT 
In any case in which the Co-Trustees are required, or desire to divide the principal 
of the Trust estate in parts or shares, they are authorized and empowered in their sole 
discretion to make division in kind, or partly in kind and partly in money. The judgment of 
the Co-Trustees concerning the values for the purposes of such division of the property or 
securities shall be binding and conclusive on all parties interested therein. 
ARTICLE XIV 
POWER OF CO-TRUSTEES 
(a) The Co-Trustees shall have all of the rights and powers conferred upon them by 
Section 75-7-402 of the Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
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(b) In the event the Co-Trustees are unable to agree on any matter in the 
administration of this Trust after the death of either FREDERICK GREEME WESTLING 
or DOROTHY R WESTLING, the decision of the survivor of FREDERICK GREEME 
WESTLING or DOROTHY E. WESTLING shall govern so long as she or he is alive and 
competent 
(c) Notwithstanding anything herein contained to the contrary, no powers 
enumerated herein or accorded to Co-Trustees generally pursuant to law shall be construed 
to enable the Grantors or the Co-Trustees or any other person to purchase, exchange or 
otherwise deal with or dispose of the principal or income of this Trust for less than an 
adequate or full consideration in money or money's worth, or to enable the Grantors or the 
Co-Trustees to borrow the income or principal of this Trust, directly or indirectly, without 
adequate interest or security. No person* other than the Co-Trustees, shall have or exercise 
the power to vote or direct the voting of any stock or other securities of this Trust, to control 
the investment of this Trust either by directing investment or reinvestments, or by vetoing 
proposed investments or reinvestments, or to reacquire or exchange any property of this 
Trust by substituting other property of an equivalent value, 
(d) It is the desire of the Grantors that the Co-Trustees consider and make 
investments in municipal bonds, mutual funds, and other areas which will return tax-free 
interest in order to minimize the income taxes and permit greater accumulation of assets 
within this Trust 
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ARTICLE XV 
RECORDS 
The Co-Trustees shall keep true and correct books of account showing all transactions 
in the Trust estate, which books of account shall at all reasonable times be open to the 
inspection of any beneficiary hereunder. Co-Trustees shall render annual statements of 
receipts and disbursements and any inventory showing the assets and property constituting 
the Trust estate to the beneficiaries of this Trust. 
ARTICLE XVr 
ADMINISTRATION 
(a) The Q>Trustees shall not be entitled to compensation for services rendered by 
them but shall be reimbursed for their out-of-pocket expenses. 
(b) Any Trustee may resign at any time upon giving thirty (30) days written notice 
to the beneficiaries then entitled to receive the income from the Trust estate, 
(c) In the event of resignation, removal inability, or refusal to act of all of the 
Trustees, a successor Trustee shall be selected by a vote of a majority of the Grantors7 
children, if the Grantors are deceased. Any successor Trustee selected shall have and may 
exercise all of the rights, powers, duties and discretion conferred or imposed upon the Co-
Trustees, Any successor Trustee appointed hereunder shall not be obligated to examine the 
accounts and actions of the previous Co-Trustees, and no successor Trustee shall be 
responsible in any way for any acts or omission of any previous Trustee, 
(d) In the event of the death, resignation, or incapacity of any of the Co-trustees, all 
rights and powers of the Co-Trustees shall thereupon vest in and be exercised by the 
remaining Co-Trustees. 
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(e) If any interest in any part of the Grantors' estate or this Trust would vest in any 
person if he were alive upon the occurrence of any contingency (such as the Grantors' death 
or the attaining of a specified age), and if such person dies under circumstances where it 
would be difficult or impossible to determine whether he was alive upon the occurrence of 
such contingency, then for purposes of this Trust, such person shall be deemed to have died 
prior to the occurrence of such contingency. 
(f) Incapacity of the Grantor shall be established by a written statement signed by 
an unrelated physician and filed with the other Co-Trustees. 
ARTICLE XVir 
SEVERABILITY 
If any provision of this Agreement shall be unenforceable, the remaining provisions 
nevertheless shall be carried into effect. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Grantors have hereunto set their hands and the Co-
trustees have caused these presents to be executed as of the day and year first above-written. 
"CO-"GRANTORS" 
% 
Frederick Greeme Westling 
Dorothy E. Westling 
USTEES" 
Frederick Greeme Westling 
Dorothy E* Westiing ' 
n W. Greenwood 




The Order Granting Dorothy Westling's Motion to Intervene 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE FREDERICK AND DOROTHY 





MINUTE ENTRY DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. 090905677 
Dorothy Westling »s Motion to Intervene is submitted to the Court for 
decision pursuant to Rule 7(d), Utah R. Civ. P. Having reviewed and 
considered all Memoranda in support, opposition and reply, the Court 
rules as follows: 
1 Dorothy Westling's Motion to Intervene is granted in full as 
prayed for. The Court finds that Dorothy Westling has satisfied the four 
part test as required by Rule 24(a), Utah R. Civ. P., as set forth in 
Chatterton v. Walker, 938 P.2d 255 (Utah 1997). 
2 This signed Minute Entry Decision shall constitute the Order 
of the Court resolving the matter referenced herein, no further Order is 
required. 
Dated this (0 _day of August, 2009. 
WESTLING TRUST V. WESTLING PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry Decision and Order, to the following, this l " 
day of August, 2009: 
Michael A. Jensen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
136 S. Main Street, Suite 430 
P.O. Box 571708 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-1708 
Elizabeth S. Conley 
Attorney for Defendant Mark Westling 
3604 Astro Circle 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109-3843 
Kent B. Alderman 
Matthew D. Cook 
Attorneys for Dorothy Westling 
201 S. Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ADDENDUM 4 
The Order Granting Dorothy Westling's Motion to Dismiss. 
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The Court has before it a request for decision filed by Dorothy 
Westling seeking a ruling on her Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing. 
The Court notes that Ms. Westling previously filed a Motion to Intervene, 
which the Court granted in a Minute Entry Decision and Order, dated 
August 18, 2009. Having reviewed the moving and responding Memoranda 
concerning the Motion to Dismiss, the Court rules as stated herein. 
In her Motion to Dismiss, Ms. Westling argues that the Co-Trustees 
of the plaintiff The Frederick and Dorothy Westling Family Trust (the 
"Trust"), Joy Greenwood and Ellen Hardman, lack standing to initiate this 
action on behalf of the Trust. Specifically, Ms. Westling, who is the 
Grantor, Co-Trustee and sole Qualified Beneficiary of the Trust, asserts 
that according to Article XVI of the Trust documents, if the Co-Trustees 
are unable to agree on any matter pertaining to the administration of the 
Trust, then she has ultimate decision-making authority. Ms. Westling 
WESTLING TRUST V. WESTLING PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
indicated that she does not consent to the litigation being initiated on 
behalf of the Trust against Mark Westling, who is her son and a fourth 
Co-Trustee of the Trust. 
The Trust, through Ms. Greenwood and Ms. Hardman, advances several 
arguments in opposition to Ms. Westling's Motion. One of these 
arguments, that Ms. Westling is not a party to these proceedings, is now 
moot in light of the Court's decision to permit Ms. Westling to intervene 
in this action. The Trust also alludes to parallel proceedings in 
probate court which challenge Ms. Westling's "cognitive abilities" and 
seek to remove both her and Mark Westling as Co-Trustees of the Trust. 
After considering the parties' respective legal positions, the Court 
determines that Article XVI(b) of the Trust documents is dispositive. 
Ms. Westling's decisions concerning the administration of the Trust 
govern so long as she is alive and competent. There has been no 
adjudication on the issue of Ms. Westling's competency at this point and 
the mere fact that she has a familial relationship with the defendant 
does not undermine the Trust language which gives her ultimate decision-
making authority concerning the Trust. Further, Article XVI(b) prevails 
over any provision of Utah trust law that may be to the contrary. 
Finally, the reasonableness of Ms. Westling's decision to not pursue 
litigation is irrelevant to the pivotal issue of whether the Co-Trustees 
have standing to bring this action in the absence of Ms. Westling's 
consent. On that issue, the Court rules that pursuant to Article XVI(b) 
WESTLING TRUST V. WESTLING PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
of the Trust, Ms. Greenwood and Ms. Hardman do not have the authority and 
therefore the standing to bring this action on behalf of the Trust. 
Since this Court lacks jurisdiction over the claims advanced by the 
Trust, Ms. Westling's Motion to Dismiss is granted. 
This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of the Court. 
Dated this // day of Septemh/ei:, 2009. 
TYRON0 E. MEDLEY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
WESTLING TRUST V. WESTLING PAGE 4 MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this f day of September, 
2009: 
Michael A. Jensen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
136 S. Main Street, Suite 430 
P.O. Box 571708 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-1708 
Elizabeth S. Conley 
Attorney for Defendant Mark Westling 
3604 Astro Circle 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109-3843 
Kent B. Alderman 
Matthew D. Cook 
Attorneys for Dorothy Westling 
201 S. Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
X J Q A ^ 
ADDENDUM 5 
The Order Denying Greenwood and Hardman's Rule 59 Motion. 
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The Court has before it a request for decision filed by the 
plaintiff seeking a ruling on its Rule 59 Motion to Set Aside or Vacate 
the Court's Ruling Granting Ms. Westling's Motion to Dismiss. Having 
reviewed the moving and responding Memoranda, the Court rules as stated 
herein. 
In its Rule 59 Motion, the plaintiff asserts that since the 
intervenor Dorothy Westling's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing was 
accompanied by her Affidavit, which was not specifically excluded from 
consideration by this Court, the Motion should have been converted to a 
Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment. Ms. Westling counters with 
persuasive case law that Motions brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) 
through (5) are not converted into Summary Judgment Motions simpLy 
because Affidavits are attached. See Spoons v. Lewis, 987 P. 2d 36 (Utah 
1999) . 
WESTLING TRUST V. WESTLING PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
In this case, Ms. Westling's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing 
challenged the plaintiff's standing to initiate this action under Article 
XVI of the relevant Trust documents. The Court's decision, in 
considering the issue of standing and hence this Court's jurisdiction 
over this matter, did not hinge on Ms. Westling's Affidavit, but was 
instead focused on the Trust language to determine whether she had 
ultimate decision-making authority with respect to Trust matters. 
Moreover, pursuant to Spoons, which the plaintiff has not addressed or 
countered, the Court was permitted to look beyond the pleadings to 
determine matters of standing. The Court concludes that the inclusion 
of Ms. Westling's Affidavit in conjunction with her Motion did not 
require this Court to convert her Motion to one for Summary Judgment. 
Further, the plaintiff's remaining assertion, that there exist issues of 
fact as to the validity of Ms. Westling's decisions, amounts to a re-
argument of its prior position, which the Court previously rejected as 
irrelevant. 
Based on the foregoing, the plaintiff's Rule 59 Motion is denied. 
This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of the Court. 
Dated this <*-' day of Octoberv/2009. 
\ 
\ 
TYRONE E. MEDLEY trt „\ \ ^ _ < / J 
DISTF/JCT COURT JUDGE / / \ A o *••......«'**', -x / 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
2l* foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this 
2009: 
_day of October, 
Michael A. Jensen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
136 S. Main Street, Suite 430 
P.O. Box 571708 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-1708 
Elizabeth S. Conley 
Attorney for Defendant Mark Westling 
3604 Astro Circle 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109-3843 
Kent B. Alderman 
Matthew D. Cook 
Attorneys for Dorothy Westling 
201 S. Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
